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BANISHMENT:
STOPPING STALKERS AT THE COUNTY LINE
Alison Hill*
INTRODUCTION
For millions of Americans, stalking is a real problem with
profound effects on their daily lives. Once thought to be a celebrity
phenomenon, 1 stalking has proven to figure prominently in the lives
of noncelebrities as well. The National Violence Against Women
(NVAW) survey found that eight percent of women and two percent
of men in the United States have been stalked at some time in their
lives. 2 Further, an estimated 1,006,970 women and 370,990 men are
stalked annually.3 It seems that no one is immune to its attacks, as
studies show that stalking crosses lines of gender, race, ethnicity, social
class, and age.4
In the face of such a prevalent problem, one would expect law
enforcement and the courts to be particularly responsive. However,
the law has been slow to respond to stalking, unwilling to craft reme-
dies to alleviate its unique problems. Beginning in 1990, every state
has passed statutes criminalizing stalking.5 While these antistalking
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; B.A., Luther
College, 2002. Special thanks to Professor Jennifer Mason for her help in the
eleventh hour.
1 See Paul E. Mullen & Michele Path6, Stalking, 29 CRIME & JUST. 273, 288
(2002).
2 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBL'N No.
169592, STALKING IN AMERICA 2 (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/
169592.pdf.
3 Id.
4 See Mullen & Pathe, supra note 1, at 288. However, though stalking has the
potential to reach everyone, the common perception of men as the stalkers and wo-
men as the victims actually does hold true. The NVAW survey revealed that seventy-
eight percent of stalking victims are women, while men represent eight-seven percent
of the stalkers. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2, at 5. By contrast, the notion that
people are stalked by strangers is not true: most victims know their stalker. Id.
5 For the antistalking statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, see
The National Center for Victims of Crime's Stalking Resource Center website. The
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laws represented an improvement over existing remedies, they are
sadly underenforced. Police have difficulty piecing together the many
discrete events necessary to a stalking case and, as a result, plenty of
stalking conduct goes unremedied.6 Though the law enforcement
community recognizes this deficiency and has adopted proposals for
change,7 these proposals do nothing for victims being stalked today.
Thus, many victims must turn to the civil sector for help.
Civilly, the system of protective orders theoretically protects vic-
tims against stalkers who have eluded police attention or who have not
yet crossed the line into criminal conduct. While the issuance of pro-
tective orders is prevalent, 8 their enforcement is not. According to
the NVAW survey, sixty-nine percent of women and eighty-one per-
cent of men said that their stalker violated a protective order.9 One of
the main problems is that law enforcement officers are often unaware
of either the existence of a protective order or its specific terms.10
Frustrated with the inadequacies of current stalking law, one Wis-
consin court crafted a unique solution: banishment. The defendant,
Margaret O'Connor, had been stalking the plaintiff, Pamela Predick,
and her family for a decade." Court orders, injunctions, and stipula-
tions did nothing to keep O'Connor at bay.12 She made untold num-
bers of threats and, as the years passed, her behavior grew increasingly
Nat'l Ctr. for Victims of Crime, Stalking Resource Center, http://www.ncvc.org/src/
main.aspx?dbID=DBState-byState-Statutesl17 (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
6 See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STALK-
ING 3 (2004) [hereinafter STALKING], available at http://www.popcenter.org/
Problems/PDFs/stalking.pdf (noting that "most police agencies across the country
have not adopted distinct stalking-intervention protocols and procedures").
7 The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), a division of the
U.S. Department of justice, has issued two lengthy reports dealing with inadequacies
in current police response to stalking and proposals for change. See generally OFFICE
OF CMTI. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CREATING AN EFFECTIVE
STALKING PROTOCOL (2002) [hereinafter CREATING AN EFFECTIVE STALKING PROTO-
COL], available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?ltem=808; STALKING,
supra note 6.
8 For example, in Massachusetts, a protective order is issued every two minutes.
OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBL'N No. 189190, ENFORCE-
MENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS 3 (2002) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE OR-
DERS], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/legalseries/
bulletin4/ncj 189190.pdf.
9 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2, at 11.
10 See ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS, supra note 8, at 2.
11 Predick v. O'Connor, 660 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
12 See id. at 2-5 (detailing prior court orders entered against O'Connor).
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more violent, as is common in many stalking cases.' 3 Renting a car for
the sole purpose of following Predick and trying to run her off the
road, 14 O'Connor made it her "'whole mission in life ... to destroy
the Predicks.'
1 5
In October 2001, the trial court found O'Connor in contempt for
her violation of an earlier court order prohibiting her from having
any contact with the Predicks.16 She violatedthis order when she
again used a rental car to stalk the Predick family, this time trying to
run another car off the road that contained the Predicks' daughter.17
As a purge condition of the contempt, the trial court prohibited
O'Connor from entering Walworth County unless appearing in
court.' 8 On appeal, the banishment condition survived attack, not-
withstanding the fact that it "seem [ed] like it was taken from the script
of some old Grade-B cowboy movie." 19 The Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals believed that O'Connor's particularly egregious behavior war-
ranted the condition, stating that it "may finally keep the tormentor at
bay. "20
According to the court in Predick, stalking victims must be given a
"'zone of protection.' 21 In some cases, the issuance of a protective
order may provide that zone of protection, putting the stalker on no-
tice that the victim is taking the threats seriously. By contrast, some
stalkers, like O'Connor, show no regard for traditional remedies like
protective orders. Given the rate at which protective orders are vio-
lated,2 2 they provide hollow comfort to victims faced with a stalker's
escalating behavior. Criminal prosecution is also possible, but again,
enforcement is low. It is here that intrastate banishment, issued
13 See Jennifer L. Bradfield, Note, Anti-Stalking Laws: Do They Adequately Protect
Stalking Victims?, 21 HAR-v. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 235-36 (1998) ("Physical attacks usually
follow months of harassing, following, or threatening, and repeated violations of civil
protection orders.").
14 660 N.W.2d at 3.
15 Jacqueline Seibel, Woman Told To Stay out of County: Appeals Court Upholds Order
in Harassment Case, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Jan. 22, 2003, at 1B (quoting Tina Busch,
Predick's business partner), available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wauk/jan03/
112690.asp.
16 660 N.W.2d at 4.
17 Id. at 2, 4.
18 Id. at 4-5.
19 Id. at 2.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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under a court's contempt powers, can step in to fill the gap in existing
law.23
While not suitable in all cases, intrastate banishment is an appro-
priate remedy for those stalkers who demonstrate that they are unable
to abide by court orders. By expanding the zone of safety, a court
decreases the possibility that the victim and the stalker will cross
paths.24 The effect is twofold: it removes potential temptation for the
stalker and provides ease of mind to victims. Further, as exercised by
courts under their contempt power, intrastate banishment has the ad-
ded effects of coercing compliance with court orders and maintaining
the integrity of the judiciary. Used in limited circumstances and with
due regard for constitutional rights, intrastate banishment has the po-
tential to become an effective weapon in the antistalking arsenal.
This Note analyzes the use of intrastate banishment as applied to
stalking. Part I describes the history of banishment, exploring its use
in antiquity and medieval times, as well as during the colonial era.
Part II explores the recent use of banishment in the criminal sector,
where some states have routinely upheld intrastate banishment as a
condition of probation. Part III examines existing legal remedies for
stalking, including criminal antistalking statutes and civil protective
orders. Part IV demonstrates how intrastate banishment issued under
a court's contempt powers is useful and indeed, necessary, in extreme
stalking cases. Finally, Part V outlines attacks on banishment, based
both on public policy as well as on constitutional grounds. Particular
attention will be paid to the possibility of a federal constitutional right
to intrastate travel, which represents intrastate banishment's most for-
midable foe. Ultimately, however, intrastate banishment survives
these attacks and emerges in the conclusion as a viable alternative in
egregious stalking cases.
23 Courts uniformly agree that interstate banishment is prohibited by either State
or Federal Constitution or public policy. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text. By contrast, intrastate banishment does not pose the same types of constitu-
tional questions and does not implicate relationships between states so as to invalidate
these provisions. See infra Part V.
24 See Predick, 660 N.W.2d at 8 ("An area smaller than the county would provide
[the stalker] with too many opportunities to meet up with her victims, who . . . live
and work in that area.").
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I. THE HISTORY OF BANISHMENT
A. The Use of Banishment in Antiquity and Medieval Times
Banishment existed in ancient civilizations as a punishment for
the most severe crimes.2 5 Because families and clans were necessary
for survival, banishment was "a significant punishment."2 6 However,
given the nature of other punishments-slavery, prison, mutilation,
beatings, and death-banishment appears to be a merciful alterna-
tive.2 7 Indeed, banishment's development in medieval England was
directly related to the Christian institutions of sanctuary and abjura-
tion.2 8 Under this system,
anyone who committed a crime could flee for refuge to a sanctuary.
If within forty days after taking sanctuary, the felon confessed his
guilt to the coroner and took an oath to leave the kingdom and not
to return without the king's permission, he was allowed to proceed
in safety to a port assigned to him.29
Though widely used from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, 30
abjuration grew out of favor and was eventually abolished in 1623.31
B. English Use of Banishment in the Colonial Era
In the wake of abjuration's fall in England, a new form of punish-
ment grew in popularity: transportation. 32 Though many British citi-
25 See, e.g., HAMMURABi'S LAws § 154, at 89 (M.E.J. Richardson trans., 2000) (pro-
viding for the exile of a father in the case of incest with his daughter); James Lin-
dgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REv.
29, 48 (1996) ("The Athenians sometimes imposed perpetual exile for homicide.").
While the law of banishment was "on the books" in many ancient civilizations, it is
unclear how much it was actually used.
26 Lindgren, supra note 25, at 47; cf Lee H. Bowker, Exile, Banishment and Trans-
portation, 24 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CIMINOLOGY 67, 67 (1980) ("To
many, social death was even more unthinkable than physical death.").
27 See Lindgren, supra note 25, at 40-51 (discussing alternative punishments).
28 Gerald R. Miller, Banishment-A Medieval Tactic in Modern Criminal Law, 5
UTAH L. REv. 365, 365 (1957).
29 Id. (citations omitted).
30 See id. at 366 ("A large part of England's criminals voluntarily banished them-
selves in this manner rather than answer to the civil authorities for their crimes.").
31 Id. The dissatisfaction with abjuration seems to result from several factors: (1)
it began to lose its deterrent effect; (2) Henry VIII imposed restrictions on its use that
practically nullified it; and (3) many men were abjuring themselves, "greatly diminish-
ing the strength of the realm." Id. at 366 & n.9.
32 See Wm. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its
Abolition Under the First Amendment, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 455,
461 (1998) ("Transportation, which was simply a different name for banishment, dra-
matically rose in popularity in seventeenth century England.").
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zens viewed prisons as "barbaric," they did not want dangerous
criminals roaming the country at large.3 3 The compromise was to
send criminals abroad-either to America or to Australia.3 4 Transpor-
tation existed as a possible penalty for many crimes, though it was
usually limited to "reasonably threatening criminals."3 5 While popu-
lar among the British, transportation was understandably criticized by
the colonists in those emerging nations. 36 The British gradually abol-
ished the practice between 1853 and 1864.37
C. Early Americans' Views of Banishment
Being on the receiving end of a criminal dumping program had a
profound effect on early Americans' views of banishment. According
to Zechariah Chafee,
[T]he idea of such laws would have been repulsive to men of [the
colonial era]. Banishments were a thing of the remote past ....
Very likely the Constitution would have failed of ratification if the
members of the state conventions had been told that the proposed
national government would be able to throw people out of this
country. 38
It must be noted, however, that much of the early debate in America
dealt with banishment from the country, whereas this Note will focus
on banishment from a county. The banishments of Roger Williams3 9
and Anne Hutchinson 4 0 for religious heresy suggest that the colonists,
33 Id.
34 Id. at 461-62 (detailing the passage of the Transportation Act of 1718). For
further discussion of criminal transportation, see generally A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND
FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIEs 1718-1775
(1987).
35 EKIRCH, supra note 34, at 31. It is important to note, however, that while trans-
portation's use was limited, it resulted in fifty thousand people banished to America
from the British Isles. Id. at 27.
36 See Miller, supra note 28, at 366 (discussing American and Australian critique
of the system).
37 Snider, supra note 32, at 462-63.
38 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at
205-06 (1956); see also Miller, supra note 28, at 367 (noting "the bitterness instilled in
the colonists . . .by transportation"); cf. EKIRCH, supra note 34, at 168 (stating that
colonists blamed transported convicts for increasing crime).
39 SeeWILLAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 184 (1954) (noting that Wil-
liams was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony after the General Court found
him guilty of sedition for his criticism of "what the majority called the true faith").
40 See id. at 135. Hutchinson was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony on
November 8, 1637. Id. The court's verdict was succinct and severe: "'You are ban-
ished from out of our jurisdiction as being a woman not fit for our society.'" Id.
(quoting the Massachusetts Bay Colony tribunal).
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despite their avowed distaste for banishment from the country, had
little problem imposing it to preserve the religious purity of the new
colonies. Indeed, intrastate banishment existed as a punishment even
after the colonial era.41
For example, a 1782 Georgia law allowed banishment from the
state as punishment for treason. 42 Those defendants who did not
comply within sixty days were apprehended and sent to a remote part
of Britain. 43 Georgia continued to allow banishment from the state
until 1877, when the Georgia Constitution was amended.44 The 1877
amended version of the Georgia Constitution (currently in force) dis-
allowed interstate banishment,45 but intrastate banishment in Georgia
was then (and still is) allowed.46 Similarly, a New York law from 1893
allowed judges to impose banishment as a sentence. 47 Reviewing that
law, the New York Supreme Court upheld its use in banishing a defen-
dant from a county for ten years as punishment for larceny.48
These limited examples serve to highlight the fact that, while in-
trastate banishment might shock our modern sensibilities, it was an
accepted method of punishment in America's early years. Indeed, for
some states, like Georgia, intrastate banishment has withstood the test
of time, existing in some form since America's founding.49
41 See Matthew D. Borrelli, Note, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public Policy
Arguments Against This Revived Ancient Punishment, 36 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 469, 471-72
(2003) (discussing the banishment practices of Massachusetts, Georgia, and New York
during the nineteenth century).
42 SeeJason S. Alloy, Note, "158-County Banishment" in Georgia: Constitutional Impli-
cations Under the State Constitution and the Federal Right To Travel 36 GA. L. REv. 1083,
1092 (2002).
43 Id. Georgia effectively gave the British a taste of their own medicine in ban-
ishing its criminals to Britain. This seems to cut against Chafee's interpretation of
early Americans' views on banishment from the country. See supra note 38 and ac-
companying text.
44 Alloy, supra note 42, at 1092-93.
45 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 21 ("Neither banishment beyond the limits of the state
nor whipping shall be allowed as a punishment for crime.").
46 The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted the 1877 Constitution as prohibit-
ing banishment from the state, but not from a more narrowly defined geographical
area. See State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 1974) (allowing banishment from seven
counties in Georgia). More recently, Georgia courts have instituted 158-county ban-
ishment conditions as a probationary measure, where the defendants are banished
from 158 out of the 159 counties in Georgia. See generally Alloy, supra note 42 (exam-
ining Georgia's use of 158-county banishment and its constitutional implications).
47 Borrelli, supra note 41, at 471.
48 People ex rel. Pasco v. Trombly, 160 N.Y.S. 67, 68 (App. Div. 1916).
49 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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II. USE OF INTRASTATE BANISHMENT IN THE CRIMINAL SECTOR
Intrastate banishment is also used in the criminal sector, where it
is sometimes imposed as a condition of probation. This Part is in-
tended to reinforce what Part I introduced, namely the existence of
banishment in the American legal landscape. In the criminal context,
banishment as a condition of probation must be reasonably related to
the crime committed or to the defendant's potential future criminal-
ity for it to be upheld. Concern for victim safety, as well as the safety
of the community, also factors into the analysis in some cases. Once
those showings are made, however, courts have upheld intrastate ban-
ishment as a condition of probation.
Courts uniformly agree that interstate banishment as a condition
of probation is prohibited by either State or Federal Constitution or
by public policy.50 According to the court in People v. Baum,5 1 "To
permit one State to dump its ... criminals into another would ...
tend to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that funda-
mental equality of political rights among the several States which is
the basis of the Union itself."52 Georgia has pushed the limits of this
policy by instituting probation conditions banishing defendants from
158 out of the 159 counties in Georgia. 53
By contrast, intrastate banishment is often upheld as a condition
of probation, provided it relates to the crime or to future criminality.
Therefore, outcomes hinge on the criminal history of the defendant
and the unique circumstances of the crime. For example, in Cobb v.
State,54 the Mississippi Supreme Court allowed banishment from a
county where the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for
shooting his nephew.5 5 Given the proximity of the victim's home to
the defendant, the court found that the banishment condition was
reasonably related to the defendant's crime and to his rehabilita-
50 See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 21 ("Neither banishment beyond the limits of
the state nor whipping shall be allowed as a punishment for crime."); McCreary v.
State, 582 So. 2d 425, 428 (Miss. 1991) (holding that banishment from the state "im-
plicates serious public policy questions against the dumping of convicts on another
jurisdiction"); State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953) ("A sentence of ban-
ishment is undoubtedly void.").
51 231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930).
52 Id. at 96.
53 See Alloy, supra note 42, at 1107 (arguing that 158-county banishment is de
facto interstate banishment).
54 437 So. 2d 1218 (Miss. 1983).
55 Id. at 1220.
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tion.5 6 Similarly, in Parrish v. State,5 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals
allowed banishment from three counties where there was a "rational
concern for the safety of others in the community and for [the] defen-
dant's own safety. ' 5
8
On the other hand, courts have overturned banishment from a
county where it was unrelated to the defendant's rehabilitation or to
the protection of society. For example, in State v. Muhammad,59 the
Montana Supreme Court held that banishment from a county was un-
related to the rehabilitation of a sex offender or to the protection of
the victim and society.60 The Oregon Court of Appeals reached a sim-
ilar result in State v. Ferre,6 1 holding that banishment from a county
was not related to the underlying offenses, nor did it promote public
safety. 6 2 Courts have also invalidated county-wide banishment on the
theory that it is void against public policy. 63
The main area of contention for many courts is whether banish-
ment serves to rehabilitate defendants. Those courts finding that ban-
ishment does not function to rehabilitate offenders usually point to
the fact that there is no community oversight of the defendant.64 The
community effectively washes its hands of the defendant and pushes
him or her elsewhere. In some cases, this is a valid concern, particu-
larly where the banishment condition is not reasonably related to the
crime. However, where a defendant has demonstrated a pattern of
criminality in a particular locale, it is easier to see why removal from
former temptations could serve a rehabilitative purpose. According to
56 See id.
57 355 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
58 Id. at 684. For other Georgia cases upholding intrastate banishment provi-
sions, see State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 474 (Ga. 1974) (banishment from seven
counties); Adams v. State, 527 S.E.2d 911, 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (banishment from
four counties); Wyche v. State, 397 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (banishment
from five counties); Edwards v. State, 327 S.E.2d 559, 561-62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(banishment from seven counties).
59 43 P.3d 318 (Mont. 2002).
60 See id. at 324; see alsoJohnson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App. 1984)
("[B]anishing appellant from the county... is not reasonably related to his rehabilita-
tion, and unduly restricts his liberty.").
61 734 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
62 See id. at 889.
63 See, e.g., People v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (stating
that fundamental public policy against banishment outweighed the state's argument
that the defendant would be given a fresh start).
64 See Snider, supra note 32, at 479; see also People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381,
387 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating that banishment as a condition of probation "is not nec-
essarily rehabilitative").
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the Georgia Court of Appeals in Wyche v. State,65 "[B] anishment obvi-
ously serves a rehabilitative function in that it removes the offender
from a locale in which he previously succumbed to the temptation of
drugs."66
The "removal from temptation" theory is arguably even stronger
in cases where victim safety is at issue. Dissenting in State v. Muham-
mad,67 Judge Rice believed that the inadequacies prevalent in the re-
straining order regime served to further legitimize the need for
intrastate banishment: "Interpreting our statute to allow [banish-
ment] conditions fulfills an important public policy.... Cases abound
where . . . defendants fail to abide by restraining orders. Police have
insufficient resources to maintain 24 hour surveillance of such individ-
uals. In such cases, banishment power in the courts provides addi-
tional security for victims .... ,"68 Thus, particularly in cases where
victim safety is a factor, intrastate banishment as a condition of proba-
tion serves to simultaneously remove a defendant from temptation
and increase the zone of protection around victims.
III. EXISTING LEGAL REMEDIES FOR STALKING
Stalking is an escalating behavior. 69 A report by the National In-
stitute of Justice found that stalkers "often commit a series of increas-
ingly serious acts, which may become suddenly violent, and result in
the victim's injury or death."70
This kind of escalation in violence was present in Predick v.
O'Connor.71 Over the course of nearly a decade, O'Connor engaged in
65 397 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
66 Id. at 739 (upholding banishment from five counties); see also State v. Collett,
208 S.E.2d 472, 474 (Ga. 1974) (holding that banishment from seven counties was not
shown to lack "a logical relationship" to rehabilitation for a drug crime); cf Oyoghok
v. Anchorage, 641 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (prohibiting a convicted
prostitute from being within a certain radius of a known prostitution area was reason-
ably related to the crime and to rehabilitation). But cf Edison v. State, 709 P.2d 510,
512 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (holding that banishment from a town was not reasonably
related to rehabilitation for a drunk driving offense).
67 43 P.3d 318 (Mont. 2002) (invalidating intrastate banishment in the case of a
sex offender).
68 Id. at 328 (Rice, J., dissenting). As Part III.B will demonstrate, Judge Rice's
characterization of the inadequacies of restraining orders is sadly true.
69 See supra note 13.
70 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PROJECT To DEVELOP A MODEL
ANTI-STALKING CODE FOR STATES 49 (1993) [hereinafter MODEL CODE], available at
http://www.popcenter.org/Problems/Supplemental-Material/Stalking/
NCJA_1993.pdf.
71 660 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
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various methods of stalking. Her primary methods of harassment in
the early years included phoning the victim, her friends and family, as
well as coworkers, medical providers, and utility services. 72 However,
after four years of this behavior, O'Connor grew violent, renting cars
for the sole purpose of finding the victim and running her off the
road.73 Not surprisingly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that
O'Connor harbored a "dangerous fixation on the people she
torments.,
74
Given a stalker's likely ascent into physical violence, the law must
be prepared to respond in kind. The challenge for courts and law
enforcement is in affording a proper amount of attention to a
stalker's threats, while at the same time dealing with limited resources.
For those who assess the situation correctly, the stalking can be
stopped in its incipiency. An incorrect analysis, however, can prove to
be fatal for a victim. 75
States currently deal with stalking in two ways: criminal antistalk-
ing statutes and civil protective orders. As will be demonstrated be-
low, there is a significant amount of stalking that goes unremedied.
This is most evident in cases where a defendant continually violates
civil protective orders, but the conduct at issue either is not severe
enough to qualify as criminal or does not receive adequate attention
from law enforcement officers. It is here that courts should use intra-
state banishment under their powers of civil contempt to fashion a
remedy that is at once severe in its effects and easy to enforce.
A. The Criminal Sector's Attempts To Deal with Stalking
1. Antistalking Statutes
Beginning with California in 1990,76 every state has adopted an
antistalking statute making stalking a crime. 77 Though most states
passed such legislation in the early 1990s, they later revised the stat-
utes to reflect the National Institute of Justice's Model Anti-Stalking
72 See id. at 2-3.
73 See id. at 3.
74 Id. at 2.
75 See Mullen & Path6, supra note 1, at 303 ("Several well-publicized stalking cases
have culminated in homicidal violence.").
76 California's passage of an antistalking statute was directly related to a number
of high profile stalking incidents, particularly the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer
by an obsessed fan. See Bradfield, supra note 13, at 243-44. For the current Califor-
nia antistalking statute, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1999).
77 See supra note 5.
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Code (the "Model Code").78 As adopted by the states, antistalking leg-
islation varies 79 and a full survey of each state's statute is beyond the
scope of this Note. Generally, however, antistalking statutes require
three basic elements: (1) a course of conduct, (2) the intent to cause
fear, and (3) actually causing fear to the victim. 80 Implicit in these
requirements is the fact that stalking is not a one-time occurrence. 81
This requires the piecing together of events taking place over the
course of days, months, and sometimes even years. By its very nature,
therefore, stalking is a difficult crime to police.8 2
2. Enforcement Deficiencies
The most carefully drafted of antistalking statutes is of no value
without police support.8 3 In drafting its antistalking statute, the Colo-
rado General Assembly explicitly encouraged police to intervene
before stalking escalates.8 4 The law enforcement community, while
78 According to the Model Code:
Any person who:
(a) purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself or her-
self or a member of his or her immediate family or to fear the death of
himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family; and
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person will be
placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or herself or a member
of his or her immediate family or will be placed in reasonable fear of the
death of himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family; and
(c) whose acts induce fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself
or herself or a member of his or her immediate family or induce fear in the
specific person of the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her
immediate family;
is guilty of stalking.
MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at 43-44.
79 While the Model Code provided guidance to the states, the resulting effects
were less than uniform. See Carol E. Jordan et al., Stalking: Cultural, Clinical and Legal
Considerations, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 513, 554-63 (2000) (discussing antistalking legislation
in a number of states).
80 See supra note 78.
81 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(f) ("For the purposes of this section, 'course
of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts occurring over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose."); see TJADEN &
THOENNES, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that "most States require that the alleged stalker
engage in a course of conduct showing that the crime was not an isolated event").
82 See, e.g., CREATING AN EFFEcrrvE STALKING PROTOCOL, supra note 7, at 13-14.
83 Id. at 3 ("[W]hile enacting legislation is a critical step, laws alone accomplish
little without clear anti-stalking policies and effective enforcement on the ground.").
84 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111(4) (a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005) ("The gen-
eral assembly hereby recognizes the seriousness posed by stalking and adopts the pro-
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well aware of its task,85 has experienced difficulties dealing with stalk-
ing. Recent studies show that most stalking enforcement problems
are directly tied to low victim reporting rates and ineffective police
response.
The NVAW survey found that only fifty-three percent of stalking
cases are actually reported to the police. 86 According to that survey,
"[w]hen asked why they chose not to report their stalking to the po-
lice, victims were most likely to state that their stalking was not a po-
lice matter, they thought the police would not be able to do anything,
or they feared reprisals from their stalkers."87 Another potential rea-
son for not reporting stalking is that victims "may minimize the risk a
stalker poses or blame themselves for the stalker's behavior." 88
Those victims actually reporting stalking to the police often meet
with low response rates. For example, in the NVAW survey, in nearly
twenty percent of reported stalking cases, the police "[d]id noth-
ing."89 Further, only twenty-two percent of stalkers in the NVAW sur-
vey were criminally prosecuted.90  At the risk of completely
undermining police response to stalking, it should be noted that fifty-
four percent of stalkers criminally tried were convicted, and of those
convicted nearly two-thirds were in jail or prison.9 1 The problem,
therefore, lies not in securing a conviction, but rather in getting
there. That is, in identifying and piecing together the events of a
stalking case.
For its part, the law enforcement community recognizes the defi-
ciencies in existing stalking policing and has attempted to develop a
model stalking protocol. 9 2 Early identification is listed as a crucial fac-
tor for improvement,9 3 as is threat assessment.94 To further simplify
police response to stalking, a four-level intervention system has been
visions of this . . . section with the goal of encouraging and authorizing effective
intervention before stalking can escalate into behavior that has even more serious
consequences.").
85 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
86 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2, at 9.
87 Id. at 9-10.
88 STALKING, supra note 6, at 3.
89 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2, at 9.
90 Id. at 10.
91 Id. at 11.
92 CREATING AN EFFEcrlvE STALKING PROTOCOL, supra note 7.
93 See id. at 28 ("Early recognition of potential stalking cases is critical to aid in
victims' safety."); STALKING, supra note 6, at 17 ("[T] he sooner police identify stalking,
the greater the chance of protecting the victim from physical harm.").
94 STALKING, supra note 6, at 20 ("Threat assessment is crucial to controlling
stalking.").
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suggested, with level one as "[f] irst police awareness" 95 and level four
as "[e] mergency intervention. '96
Law enforcement's recognition of and proposals to the problem
are to be commended. However, 150 pages of suggestions for the fu-
ture9 7 do nothing to help those dealing with stalking today. Thus,
victims are often forced to turn to the civil sector, where they meet
with equally inefficient systems of response.
B. Underenforcement of Civil Protective Orders
In the face of the criminal system's inability to deal with stalking,
it is shocking that the civil system has proven equally unable to answer
stalking victims' cries for help. Protective orders98 theoretically pro-
tect stalking victims, but as will be demonstrated, underenforcement
renders them virtually meaningless in many stalking cases. Recall that
according to the NVAW survey, sixty-nine percent of women and
eighty-one percent of men said that their stalker violated a protective
order.99
The underenforcement of protective orders can be attributed in
part to administrative difficulties. When responding to calls for help,
law enforcement officers are often unaware of either the existence of
a protective order or its specific terms. I00 Because they are individu-
ally tailored to the specific stalker (e.g., prohibiting the stalker from
being within a certain number of feet from a victim or from being at
certain places like the victim's home or work), it is not surprising that
officers do not have the time or the resources to deal with the particu-
larities of protective orders. Massachusetts sought to remedy this by
creating the Massachusetts Registry of Civil Restraining Orders, which
is used by both law enforcement personnel and courts. 101 Following
Massachusetts's lead, other states attempted to standardize the protec-
tive order process. 10 2
Despite these efforts, though, the proliferation of protective or-
ders undoubtedly slows the system.10 3 It stands to reason that law en-
95 Id. at 22.
96 Id. at 23.
97 See generally CREATING AN EFFECTrVE STALKING PROTOCOL, supra note 7; STALK-
ING, supra note 6.
98 Protective orders are also referred to as "restraining orders" or "injunctions."
ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS, supra note 8, at 1.
99 See supra text accompanying note 9.
100 See supra text accompanying note 10.
101 ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS, supra note 8, at 2.
102 See id. at 3.
103 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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forcement officers and courts are going to be constantly behind when
attempting to ascertain the existence and terms of a protective order.
While the inevitable delay might cause only inconvenience or annoy-
ance in some cases, it might prove to be a severe deficiency in extreme
stalking cases.
A final problem with protective orders is that they must be re-
newed in order to remain effective. Most states limit the duration of a
protective order to one to three years. 10 4 To renew a protective order,
a victim must usually face the stalker in court, having the effect of
reconnecting a stalker with his or her victim. 105 Such a result is partic-
ularly unsavory where a victim has gone into hiding to avoid the
stalker. 106
IV. INTRASTATE BANISHMENT UNDER COURTS' CONTEMPT POWERS
Clearly, the existing criminal and civil systems leave much stalk-
ing behavior unremedied. While law enforcement has taken steps to-
wards curing deficiencies in the respective systems, victims need
security now. It is here that intrastate banishment, imposed under a
court's contempt power, can fill the gap. Properly reserved for those
cases where a defendant has demonstrated unwillingness to comply
with court orders, intrastate banishment issued as a purge condition
of contempt simultaneously punishes the disobedient defendant, cre-
ates a zone of safety for the victim, and encourages respect for the
court.
Courts possess inherent powers of contempt'0 7 which they
use to coerce recalcitrant defendants to comply with court
104 ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS, supra note 8, at 5. Some states have ex-
tended the duration of a protective order. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(k) (West
1999) (granting the sentencing court the power to issue a restraining order that is
effective for up to ten years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.12.2 (West 2003) (authorizing a
five-year protective order). However, both of these extensions are only available if the
stalker has committed the crime of stalking and do not extend to the civil sector.
105 See ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS, supra note 8, at 5; see also OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBL'N No. 189192, STRENGTHENING ANTIS-
TALKING STATUTES 5 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/
bulletins/legalseries/bulletinl/ncj189192.pdf (stating that "reapplying for a protec-
tive order may inadvertently reconnect stalkers with their victims").
106 See ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS, supra note 8, at 5.
107 See, e.g., State v. Roll, 298 A.2d 867, 875 (Md. 1973) (noting history of the
courts' "inherent" contempt powers); Zakany v. Zakany, 459 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio
1984) ("[C]ertain powers . . .are necessary for the orderly and efficient exercise of
justice .... Such inherent power includes the authority to punish the disobedience of
the court's orders with contempt proceedings." (citations omitted)).
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orders.10 8 Whereas criminal contempt punishes a defendant for previ-
ous misconduct, civil coercive contempt is designed to encourage fu-
ture compliance.10 9 Because a finding of contempt depends on the
existence of a prior court order, this remedy necessarily assumes that
a court has already issued a court order, which the defendant has dis-
obeyed. In an extreme stalking case, where the defendant has demon-
strated a marked disrespect for court orders, the case for coercive
contempt is especially strong. The court would issue an intrastate
banishment provision as a condition to purge the contempt, just as
the court did in Predick v. O'Connor1 10
An intrastate banishment provision is simple in its terms and al-
lows law enforcement officers to act immediately without being forced
to peruse pages of protective order conditions. Particularly where the
stalker is an egregious violator of court orders, police need provisions
that are easy to understand and to apply in the face of escalating vio-
lence. Intrastate banishment is such a provision: if the stalker is found
in the county, he or she will be in contempt. In some situations, this
immediacy of action might successfully stop a stalker's violent behav-
ior in its incipiency.
Of course, the effectiveness of intrastate banishment as a condi-
tion of contempt invariably hinges on the responsiveness of law en-
forcement officers. Though intrastate banishment provisions are
easier to ascertain and to apply than protective orders, they will do no
good without the help of capable police officers to enforce them.
Nevertheless, given the gross inadequacies in current law, it appears
that a remedy that at once simplifies response and strongly coerces
compliance is necessary.
V. ATrACKS ON BANISHMENT
Intrastate banishment is only useful, however, if it can withstand
defendants' legal attacks. Courts and commentators alike criticize
banishment on several different grounds, usually discussing the consti-
tutional implications and public policy concerns. This Part will out-
line a number of those arguments against banishment, ultimately
concluding that intrastate banishment, when reserved for egregious
cases of court order violations, withstands these attacks and is there-
fore an important additional remedy for courts.
108 See, e.g., Roll 298 A.2d at 876 ("A civil contempt proceeding is intended to
preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to
orders and decrees .. .
109 See, e.g., id.
110 660 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
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A. The Right To Travel
1. Federal Constitutional Right To Travel
Although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the right
to travel has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental
right.1 1 ' The Court's discussion of the right to travel has been limited
to the issue of interstate travel, with the Court most recently attribut-
ing the right to such travel to either the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 12 the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV, 113 or the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 114 As to intrastate travel, however, the Court
has only considered the issue in passing.1 15
The Circuit Courts of Appeal are split on intrastate travel, with
the majority of courts finding that there is a federal constitutional
right to intrastate travel.1 16 As will be demonstrated in this Part, those
111 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("The constitutional right to
travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized."). That the right to travel is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution was of no import to the Court in Guest, mainly because it was seen as "a
right so elementary" that it was a "necessary concomitant" of life in the Union. Id. at
758. The Court in Guest never attributed the right to travel to any particular constitu-
tional provision, finding simply that "[a]ll have agreed that the right exists." Id. at
759.
112 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 509 (1999) (finding unconstitutional a Califor-
nia law basing welfare benefits for the first year of California residence on the level of
benefits the recipient had in his or her former state of residence). Given the narrow
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), it is surprising that the Court used it to
find a right to interstate travel. Saenz marks the second time that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been invoked in finding a right
to travel. SeeEdwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas,J., concurring)
("The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship
protected by the privileges and [sic] immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against state interference.").
113 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501.
114 Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 911 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating a New York law that gave hiring preference to veterans who were New
York residents); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (upholding a law deny-
ing free public education based on residency requirements).
115 Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974) ("Even were we
to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel, [it is] a
question we do not now consider . . ").
116 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a
federal constitutional right to intrastate travel); Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 267
(3d Cir. 1990) (same); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d
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cases finding a federal right to intrastate travel stand on shaky ground
when examined for precedents used and reasoning employed. Fur-
ther, even if the reasoning were to be accepted, it should be confined
to the factual scenarios of those cases. Prior cases finding a federal
right to intrastate travel have examined it in the context of drug exclu-
sion zones,117 cruising,118 and public housing durational residency re-
quirements. 119  Stalking is distinguishable, representing safety
concerns entirely absent in those cases. Therefore, there should be
no federal right to intrastate travel when evaluating banishment in the
context of stalking.
In Johnson v. City of Cincinnati,120 the Sixth Circuit invalidated a
city ordinance that excluded an individual with a drug conviction
from certain drug exclusion zones in the city.121 Recognizing the
right to intrastate travel, Johnson specifically distinguished an earlier
case, 122 Wardwell v. Board of Education of Cincinnati,1 23 where the same
court had held that there was no federal constitutional right to intra-
state travel. 124 Ultimately settling on substantive due process as the
source of the right to intrastate travel,1 25 the Johnson court attributed
the existence of the right to historical endorsement and practical
necessity.126
Johnson has been criticized for its reasoning, particularly for its
use of the "freedom of movement" cases in finding a right to intrastate
travel. 127 Basing the existence of the right to intrastate travel on cases
Cir. 1971) (same). But seeWright v. City ofJackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1975)
(denying the existence of a federal constitutional right to intrastate travel). Other
courts have avoided the intrastate travel inquiry altogether by narrowly framing the
issues of the case. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (construing a sex offender's desire to enter and to remain in public parks
as a right to loiter, not to travel).
117 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 487-88.
118 Lutz, 899 F.2d at 256-57.
119 King, 442 F.2d at 646-47.
120 310 F.3d 484.
121 Id. at 487. The Supreme Court of Ohio struck down the same ordinance one
year earlier in State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 2001).
122 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 498.
123 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
124 Id. at 627 (upholding a city ordinance requiring all Cincinnati teachers to es-
tablish residency in the city school district within ninety days of employment).
125 310 F.3d at 498.
126 Id. ("In view of the historical endorsement of a right to intrastate travel and the
practical necessity of such a right, we hold that the Constitution protects a right to
travel locally through public spaces and roadways.").
127 See Peter M. Flanagan, Note, Trespass-Zoning: Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer Fu-
ture by Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE D aME L. REv. 327, 353 (2003)
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like Kent v. Dulles128 and Kolender v. Lawson129 resulted in a "mixed
bag" of rights, commingling protections found in other cases but not
specifically implicated in Johnson. For example, the issue in Kent was
whether passports could be denied to Communists. I 30 This implicates
the right to foreign travel, a right that, while deserving of constitu-
tional protection, has not enjoyed the same status as the right to inter-
state travel.1 31 Kolender dealt with First Amendment vagueness issues
in an antiloitering statute. 32 To ground the right to intrastate travel
in these cases 133 raises well founded suspicions and Johnson cannot
withstand the attack that it impermissibly drew on protections ac-
knowledged in other cases but necessarily limited to those spheres. 13 4
Yet a survey of the Supreme Court's cases on the right to travel
demonstrates that the Court has been markedly lenient in its reason-
ing here. 35 Do these allowances in the realm of interstate travel trans-
late to intrastate travel reasoning? The answer, it seems, may be
found in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,13 6 where the Court
again distinguished between interstate and intrastate travel. 13 7 This
distinguishing, seen in Memorial Hospital'38 and again in Bray, reveals
("The right to freedom of movement that has developed from Supreme Court cases
such as [Kent and Kolender] cannot... be extended to envelop the purported right to
intrastate travel.").
128 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) ("Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values."), cited with approval in Johnson, 310 F.3d at 497.
129 461 U.S. 352, 358, 361 (1983) (finding a loitering statute unconstitutional on
vagueness grounds), citied with approval in Johnson, 310 F.3d at 497.
130 357 U.S. at 117-20.
131 See, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 178 (1978) (upholding a provi-
sion of the Social Security Act that denied benefits during any month during which
the individual was out of the United States).
The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified. By con-
trast, the "right" of international travel has been considered to be no more
than an aspect of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.... Thus, legislation which is said to infringe the freedom
to travel abroad is not to be judged by the same standard applied to laws that
penalize the right of interstate travel ....
Id. at 176-77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
132 461 U.S. at 353-54.
133 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 497-98 ("In light of these cases, we find that the right to
travel locally through public spaces and roadways enjoys a unique and protected place
in our national heritage.").
134 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
136 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
137 Id. at 277 (holding that prohibitions against anti-abortion demonstrations are
"purely intrastate restriction [s]" that do "not implicate the right of interstate travel").
138 415 U.S. 250 (1974); see supra note 115.
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that the Court does not view intrastate travel as a necessary concomi-
tant of interstate travel that is worthy of federal constitutional protec-
tion. 139 This analysis has not garnered support in the majority of the
Courts of Appeals, however, where courts insist on finding a right to
intrastate travel. 140
This stubborn insistence on finding a right to intrastate travel in-
evitably opens the door to an ad hoc analysis. The Johnson court's
appeal to history and practical necessity illustrates the analytical strug-
gles that ensue when the courts attempt to attribute the right to intra-
state travel to a particular constitutional source.141 The court in Lutz
v. City of York142 found that the right to travel has been attributed to
seven different sources: "the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause, a conception of national citizenship said to be implicit in 'the
structural logic of the Constitution itself,' the Commerce Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, ard each of the Due Process Clauses." 143
Like the court in Johnson,14 the Lutz court ultimately determined that
the right to intrastate travel should be ascribed to substantive due pro-
cess.1 45 The reasoning used, however, is admittedly ad hoc 146 and not
without criticism. 147
The appropriate inquiry in substantive due process cases is
whether the right at issue is "fundamental." That is, whether the right
is "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' . . . and 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed. "'148 The courts in Johnson
139 SeeJohnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 508 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gilman,J.,
dissenting) (construing Bray as meaning that there is no fundamental right to intra-
state travel); see also Mary LaFrance, Constitutional Implications of Acquisition-Value Real
Property Taxation: Assessing the Burdens on Travel and Commerce, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1027,
1054 ("Without explicitly saying so, Bray appears to reject the existence of a right to
intrastate travel . . . ."). However, it could also be argued that Bray focused on
whether the fight to interstate travel was violated, not whether the right to intrastate
travel existed. See Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminaliza-
tion, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 1, 44 n.341 (1996).
140 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
142 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
143 Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
144 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
145 See 899 F.2d at 267.
146 Id. at 268 (admitting that ascribing the right to intrastate travel to substantive
due process is "unquestionably ad hoc").
147 Flanagan, supra note 127, at 349-55.
148 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted) (de-
clining to find a fundamental fight to physician-assisted suicide).
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and Lutz determined that the right to intrastate travel did, in fact,
enjoy such stature. 149 This is surprising because the Supreme Court
has never ruled that the right to intrastate travel is a fundamental
right. 150
Cases like Johnson and Lutz can be distinguished on the grounds
that they did not implicate the same safety concerns as stalking.
Therefore, even if a court were to recognize intrastate travel as a fun-
damental right, the state's compelling interest in victim safety would
present a difficult hurdle for a defendant to cross. Under a proper
analysis of the Supreme Court's case law, there is no right to intrastate
travel, but even those circuits finding it in the past should recognize
the qualitatively different considerations that stalking presents. In
sum, federal constitutional law should not prevent a court from im-
posing a county-wide banishment provision in egregious stalking
cases.
2. State Constitutional Right To Travel
Of course, this leaves open the possibility that the right to intra-
state travel might be protected by states. While a full survey of state
cases examining the right to intrastate travel is beyond the scope of
this Note, it should be noted that some states have recognized the
right to intrastate travel. 151 This should not be seen as a complete bar
to intrastate banishment, however, for the right- recognized by those
states is surely subject to some restriction, particularly in the face of
egregious stalking conduct. In other words, stalkers' rights to travel
between counties without interference should not trump victims'
rights to do the same. 152 Additionally, in some cases, the safety of
society as a whole might be at issue, further counseling courts to re-
strict the defendant's right to intrastate travel. 1 53
149 SeeJohnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002); Lutz, 899
F.2d at 267.
150 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (listing as fundamental rights the right to
marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to
marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion).
151 See, e.g., State v. Cuypers, 559 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997);
Brandmiller v. Arreola, 544 N.W.2d 894, 899 (Wis. 1996); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608,
615 (Wyo. 1999).
152 See Predick v. O'Connor, 660 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (Anderson,J.,
concurring) (noting that the trial court "had to balance [the defendant's] right to
travel throughout [the] county against the right of the victims to move freely and
safely throughout [the] county").
153 See id. ("The court also properly considered the safety of all who travel in [the]
county. Because [the defendant] had endangered others while exercising her right
to travel, the court appropriately concluded that to ensure the victims and the citi-
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B. Freedom of Association
Stalkers may also try to challenge intrastate banishment under
the freedom of association. Seen not as an enumerated right, but
rather as a necessary concomitant to the protection of individual lib-
erty interests, 15 4 freedom of association has long been recognized as
an important right. 155 Associational rights are of two types: (1) inti-
mate association, and (2) expressive association. 156
As to intimate association, the freedom of association protects the
right "to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relation-
ships."15 7 Protected intimate associations include those "personal
bonds [that] have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of
the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and be-
liefs,"'158 thereby serving to "foster diversity and act as critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the State." 5 9 In the intra-
state banishment context, the outcome under an intimate associa-
tional challenge will inevitably hinge on the relationship claimed to
have been infringed. 160  In Predick v. O'Connor,16 1 the defendant
claimed an infringement of this type of associational right because her
mother lived in Walworth County and she was unable to see her
zenry as a whole could freely and safely travel within [the] county, [the defendant]
had to be banished from the county.").
154 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) ("The Constitution guar-
antees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving
other individual liberties.").
155 See, e.g., Snider, supra note 32, at 493 (discussing the importance of freedom of
association).
156 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
157 Id. at 617.
158 Id. at 618-19.
159 Id. at 619.
160 See id. at 620 (suggesting the limits of the intimate association doctrine). Ac-
cording to Roberts, some important factors to consider in determining whether the
association at issue is deserving of protection are
relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship. As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of quali-
ties are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding
of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty. Con-
versely, an association lacking these qualities-such as a large business enter-
prise-seems remote from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional
protection.
Id.
161 660 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
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there. 16 2 However, she also conceded that "her right to associate with
her mother is not absolute."1 6 3 Because the mother's house was
across the street from the victims' residence, the court found that
there was an appropriate balancing in tailoring the banishment provi-
sion.164 Thus, the right to intimate association should be tempered by
the threat a stalker poses to the victim.
As to expressive association, the issue is whether banishment
places undue limits on the rights enjoyed under the First Amend-
ment, namely those of "speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion."'1 65 It has been suggested that
banishment "unconstitutionally deprive[s] that [banished] individual
of the ability to affect the political process in the geographical area in
which his speech would be most relevant."' 66 In this regard, banish-
ment is seen as harmful not only to the person banished, but also to
the community that might otherwise have benefited from his or her
opinions. 16 7 Yet in the case of stalking-where the defendant's forms
of expression are the problem-it must be questioned whether ban-
ishment represents such a societal detriment. 16 A community is not
"deprived" when stalkers with violent tendencies must express them-
selves elsewhere.
Associational rights are not absolute, and they are properly cir-
cumscribed where stalkers, through their conduct, have forfeited
those rights. Because intrastate banishment should be imposed
through courts' contempt powers only in cases where defendants have
demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with court orders, associa-
tional concerns will not likely be at issue. Therefore, intrastate banish-
ment should survive this constitutional attack as well.
C. Public Policy Concerns
Some courts considering banishment in the criminal context
have determined that it is void against public policy. 169 These courts
argue that banishment simply shifts the burden of criminal monitor-
162 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 12-14, Predick, 660 N.W.2d 1 (No. 02-0503),
2002 WL 32329883. According to the defendant, "there is no justification for
barr[ing] [her] from associating with her mother anywhere in Walworth County." Id.
at 14.
163 Id. at 13.
164 See 660 N.W.2d at 2, 8.
165 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
166 Snider, supra note 32, at 495.
167 See id.
168 See id. at 496.
169 See, e.g., People v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
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ing to another community. 170 Even where the defendant suggests
banishment as a condition of probation, these courts believe that the
public policy against the practice is so strong that banishment should
not be allowed. 171 Further, though banishment may remove a defen-
dant from former temptations, the possibility exists that new ones will
arise. The combination of these factors has led some courts to deter-
mine that banishment is void against public policy.
While these concerns are legitimate, they are not enough to out-
weigh victim security in stalking cases. Though a defendant's "fresh
start"172 in People v. Blakeman175 was not enough tojustify banishment,
the safety of victims should properly counsel in favor of intrastate ban-
ishment in the stalking context. Further, the possibility of new tempta-
tions arising is certainly not enough to outweigh the probability that,
left unchecked, a stalker will become increasingly violent. 174 In cases
where traditional court orders have done nothing to remedy the situa-
tion, the stronger policy by far is to turn to a more severe remedy,
namely intrastate banishment.
CONCLUSION
Given the current deficiencies in the criminal and civil system,
additional protections are necessary if stalkers are to be kept away
from their victims. In the face of continual protective order violations
and escalating violence, courts need to be equipped with more effec-
tive remedies. It is here that intrastate banishment can serve as an
alternative weapon in extreme stalking cases. This is not to say that
every stalking case merits banishment for the stalker. Rather, banish-
ment must be reserved for the truly egregious cases. For example, in
Predick v. O'Connor,'75 the defendant's behavior had continued over a
period of a decade and resulted in numerous violations of protective
orders. 176 There are many other cases across the nation with frighten-
ingly comparable results.
Additionally, intrastate banishment provisions must be attuned to
the particular facts of the case. An order banishing a stalker from an
entire county might not be reasonable where all of the activities have
taken place in a concentrated geographic area, like a neighborhood
170 See Borrelli, supra note 41, at 484.
171 See Blakeman, 339 P.2d at 203.
172 Id.
173 339 P.2d 202.
174 See supra note 13.
175 660 N.W.2d I (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
176 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
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or a town. On the other hand, county-wide banishment is appropriate
in a case like Predick, for example, where the stalker is mobile and
does not confine the stalking behavior to a narrow region. The court
in Predick found dispositive the fact that the stalker frequently rented
cars to drive around Walworth County, 177 despite having no reason to
be there,1 78 and "pose[d] a constant and dangerous threat any time
she [was] present in the county."179
Though banishment presents a number of challenges-on both
constitutional and public policy grounds-the need for victim safety
should trump these challenges in the extreme cases. Where stalkers
have proven unwilling to abide by court orders, a court should be able
to resort to a measure such as banishment to simultaneously create a
zone of protection around the victim and engender respect for court
orders.
Nevertheless, it is unknown whether intrastate banishment would
be effective as employed. Though it carries a severe bark, its bite is
dependent on law enforcement support and victim communication.
However, for a police department with useful stalking strategies and a
simplified system of response, an intrastate banishment provision
could be easily implemented. Still, banishment does not necessarily
assure victims complete security, as they might receive unwanted
phone calls or e-mails. Yet the most grievous problem-the potential
for physical attack-will be greatly reduced by widening the zone of
protection around victims. For those who have lived in fear for so
long, a remedy is needed. In proper cases, intrastate banishment
might indeed be that remedy.
177 See 660 N.W.2d at 7.
178 O'Connor did not live or work in the county from which she was banished. Id.
179 Id. at 8.
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